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E xecut ive  Summary
1 Relevant information on strategic cyber security investments in Belgium were not available publicly so have not been included. Most research grant funding in 
this area is concentrated, with KU Leuven particularly prominent.
Cyber security is one of the major challenges facing our 
modern connected digital world. As we build ever more 
connected infrastructures and digital services, not only the 
security of the data in our digital economy, but also the safety 
and continued operation of critical systems such as water, 
power and transportation, rely on them being cyber secure. 
The National Security Strategy has a goal to make the UK 
the safest place to do business online in the world. Research 
at UK universities plays a leading role in meeting this goal 
– anticipating the cyber security challenges of emerging 
and future technologies and identifying methods, tools and 
technologies to mitigate the risks of harm.
The UK is currently recognised as one of the leading countries 
in the world in cyber security research. This is evidenced by 
research outputs in leading international venues, research 
collaborations with major international centres and global 
industry organisations and key UK researchers acting on 
the international advisory bodies of major research centres 
worldwide and global policy forums.
Is this global position sustainable? Or, as other countries up 
their game and invest heavily in cyber security, do we risk 
falling behind if comparable level of investment in research on 
cyber security are not made by the UK? 
We have identified and characterised, where possible, the 
strategic investments in cyber security research made by 
some of the leading research nations in the world, namely, 
the UK, USA, EU Horizon 2020 programme, France, Germany, 
Israel and Singapore1. We have analysed funding allocated 
from 2012–2019 through strategic calls for research grants and 
large centres in these countries to evaluate and compare the 
types and values of those strategic investments, with particular 
context given to the current and planned future investments 
in cyber security research in the UK. Through this analysis we 
provide an evidence-based perspective on whether the nature 
and rate of investment made in UK cyber security research will 
remain at par with our major competitors worldwide and, if not, 
identify the risks of not doing so for the future of UK research 
and innovation – and its global leadership in this critical sector.
F ind ings
• Significant capacity has been developed in the UK between 2012 and 2019 through the 19 Academic Centres of Excellence 
in Cyber Security Research (ACE-CSRs), the four EPSRC-NCSC Research Institutes, the four Centres for Doctoral Training, 
the Centre for Security Information Technologies (CSIT) and the PETRAS National Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security of 
Internet of Things. 
• However, major long-term investments in other nations, especially, the USA, France and Germany, are leading to the 
development of large clusters of research excellence. These pose risks not only with regards to brain drain from the UK but 
also, based on levels of investment from 2012–2019 and continuing investments beyond 2019, to maintaining the UK’s position 
as a leading nation for research and innovation in cyber security.  
• In absolute terms, and as a percentage of GDP, UK investment in cyber security research falls significantly behind our major 
competitors. There is a need for a step change in investment in cyber security research in various forms – strategic clusters of 
excellence, doctoral training and the creation of national research facilities – in order to sustain and maintain the UK’s cyber 
security research position in the world. 
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Recommendat ions
Based on the detailed analysis presented in this report, we make three recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The UK needs to make long-term large-scale investments in developing clusters of research 
excellence in cyber security. 
The ACE-CSR scheme has defined a substantial community of UK cyber security researchers and the four EPSRC-NCSC 
research institutes have delineated sub-communities within this group. However, compared with large long-term investments 
in the USA (e.g., the NSA Lablets), France (e.g., through INRIA) and Germany (e.g., through large centres such as ATHENE in 
Darmstadt, CISPA in Saarbrucken, Kastel in Karlsruhe and Max Planck in Bochum), the UK needs to develop similar clusters of 
excellence. These could take the form of Regional Clusters of Excellence whereby strategic investment in ACE-CSRs in particular 
regions enables them to come together with industry to sustain and grow world-leading research competence. These may also 
take the form of Mission-based Clusters of Excellence whereby strategic investments on the basis of long-term research missions 
mobilise a range of ACE-CSRs into sustaining and growing world-leading research capability. 
Recommendation 2: The long-term health of UK cyber security research requires signif icant growth in capacity building 
through strategic investment in doctoral research funding to train future R&D leaders in cyber security. 
The UK has built a strong community of doctoral researchers through investment in Centres for Doctoral Training funded by 
EPSRC and through the NCSC-funded doctoral studentships in ACE-CSRs. This differs from competitor nations internationally 
where funding for doctoral students often forms part of core research funding to institutions. The current funding for Centres 
for Doctoral Training in cyber security is £17.8M. This contrasts with £100M for doctoral training in AI – another important area 
for R&D capacity building. The NCSC-funded studentships have helped grow capacity in ACE-CSRs but, in real terms, the 
investment has shrunk as the number of ACE-CSRs has grown from an initial eight to 19. As we build increasingly complex, 
interconnected infrastructures, the long-term goal of making and sustaining the UK as the safest place to do business online 
in the world requires significant investment in the next generation of researchers. This is critical in order to meet the growing 
shortage of highly-skilled personnel in this topic of major national and global importance. 
Recommendation 3: National research facilities are critical for researchers to validate their ideas on large-scale 
experimental plat forms – providing a competitive edge for innovative products and services that are evidence-based and 
globally leading in enhancing cyber security of emerging hyperconnected environments.  
Longer-term funding in other countries, most notably Singapore, has supported the creation of national facilities. In the UK 
some unique facilities have been developed through investment via small grants, internal resourcing from universities and 
through collaboration with industry. Long-term investment in innovative products and services requires facilities on a scale that 
enables empirical validation of innovative research ideas in real-scale environments. A step change is needed in investment 
in experimental research facilities – both with regards to linking and opening up existing facilities into a national resource and 
development of new facilities where such capacity currently does not exist. This provides an opportunity to establish a globally-
leading position for the UK.
The future of the UK’s Cyber Security  
Research Position in the World
Professor Awais Rashid University of Bristol, UK
Professor Chris Hankin  Imperial College London, UK
Professor Steve Schneider  University of Surrey, UK
5 6
Methodo logy
The analysis presented in this report focuses on strategic 
investments in the various countries between 01 January 2012 
and 31 December 2019. Only investments made by states into 
cyber security research at academic research institutions were 
included.  
Strategic investments that started before 2012, e.g., Centre 
for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT) Phase I (Tranche 
2) are pro-rated versus the estimated value during the period 
2012-2019, while CSIT Phase II funding is included in full. 
Similarly, where the allocated funding lasts beyond 2019, the 
figure for 2012-2019 includes the pro-rated values while the 
total investment from 2012 includes the figures from 2012 
until the end of the award period. EU Horizon 2020 funding 
has been included in each state where funding was allocated 
to a university within it. This takes the direct allocation 
plus a percentage proportion (derived from allocation) of 
administration funding.
Note, funding that has been announced before 31 December 
2019 but where awards won’t start until 2020 is not included 
in the analysis, e.g., in the case of the UK, the UKRI Digital 
Security by Design and AI for Security/Security of AI funding 
calls. The same restrictions were applied to any funding for 
other countries. 
The data for each country was collected from public 
information sources and cross-validated with funders’ online 
databases, wherever such cross-validation was possible. 
The data collection was undertaken by two researchers who 
cross-checked and validated each other’s work and assisted 
each other in further data collection and source validation in 
order to ensure the fullest coverage possible. Where needed, 
we also sought advice and confirmation for data sources from 
colleagues in relevant countries. As not all countries maintain 
centralised government or funder databases, the cross-
validation was more rigorous in the case for the UK, Singapore 
and the USA due to the existence of funder databases.  
The full list of sources consulted during data collection and 
completeness of that information is included in the Appendix  
to this report. 
Definition of Strategic Investment:  
This is considered as any funding provided by a state 
(or relevant EU Horizon 2020 funding) specifically for 
cyber security research. This may be through targeted 
calls for research grants, establishing centres or 
through funding initiatives, e.g., for doctoral training, to 
increase cyber security capability. We recognise that a 
number of research projects are funded in the UK and 
in other countries through responsive mode or generic 
calls. However, these are not considered strategic 
investments and are not included in this analysis. For 
example, in the UK context, the data includes the Digital 
Economy Trust, Identity, Privacy and Security (DETIPS 
I and II) funding calls but not any responsive mode ICT 
grants or centres such as CREST (which is generally 
focused on behavioural sciences approaches to 
security rather than a specific focus on cyber security). 
Similarly, in Germany, for instance, we do not include 
the CROSSING centre at TU Darmstadt – although it 
is focused on Cryptography-based Security Solutions, 
the award was through a general competitive call for 
centres rather than a specific strategic call on cyber 
security. 
Country
Total Validated 
Investments 
from 2012
Total Investment 
between 
2012 - 2019
France £103,649,423 £97,367,302
Germany £454,097,364  £110,790,338
Israel £30,177,390  £24,220,398
Singapore £81,196,500 £63,542,357
UK £126,062,760 £77,368,991
USA £527,578,080 £356,028,268
EU Horizon 
2020
£54,688,818 £13,213,658
Table 1: Strategic cyber security investments by country
Potential under-assessment of strategic investment internationally 
The most complete data in our analysis comes from the UK – in part due to our familiarity with the research funding 
landscape and partly due to the policy of research funding openness, which makes finding and tracking strategic 
investments easier. The incompleteness of data for several countries means that we may be under-assessing their true 
strategic spend. For instance, for all countries (apart from the UK), strategic investment in doctoral training is difficult to 
ascertain as this is part of core grants to universities, unlike the strategic or competitive nature of Centres for Doctoral 
Training in the UK (and also the Doctoral Training Grants to universities which are determined based on research grants 
awarded to institutions). 
Furthermore, in countries such as Germany and France, the national grant awards are primarily for the additional costs of 
salaries for postdoctoral researchers rather than on a full economic costing basis, as is the case for the UK. Therefore, the 
funds are utilised for building additional capacity rather than also funding core academic staff and facilities as in the full 
economic costing model in the UK.
5 6
Figure1: S
trategic investm
ent in cyber security per country, w
ith expansion to a detailed view
 of U
K
 strategic investm
ent in cyber security.
7 8
How does  the  UK  approach cont ras t  w ith  re search  capac it y  bu ild ing  
inte rna t iona lly ?
The UK’s approach to research capacity building takes three primary forms: 
• Investments through strategic funding calls for research projects, for example, DE TIPS I and II, and Human Dimensions of 
Cyber Security, which aim to address specific research questions through projects, and also lead to training of postdoctoral 
researchers; 
• Centres and Research Institutes, for example, the PETRAS National Centre of Excellence on Cyber Security of Internet 
of Things, the four EPSRC-NCSC Research Institutes, as well as the Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security 
Research (ACE-CSRs) programme; 
• Strategic training of future R&D leaders in cyber security through Centres for Doctoral Training (CDTs) – initially there were 
two such centres at Royal Holloway, University of London and University of Oxford. At the time of this report two additional 
cyber security CDTs have been awarded at University of Bristol (jointly with University of Bath) and University College 
London. There has also been a programme of competitively-funded PhD studentships from NCSC through the ACE-CSRs.
This is in contrast to most other states where the primary strategic investment is in research funding (at postdoctoral level) with 
doctoral training regularly funded through core PhD funding programmes to universities. This provides a regular and growing pool 
of cyber security researchers to fulfil the workforce needs in academia, industry and education whilst maintaining a steady level 
of research-only / blue-sky research investment. However, some specific training-focused investments or mixed investments that 
support both research and training exist. For instance, in France, there are strategic initiatives funded in Brittany to increase the 
regional number of Master’s and PhD level graduates in cyber security. In the USA, the NSA Lablets support both research and 
doctoral training, and the same is the case for strategic investments by the Israel National Cyber Bureau (INCB). 
Importance of doctoral training in capacity building 
The Centres for Doctoral Training in the UK represent a significant investment to develop a critical mass of doctoral 
researchers through a cohort-based approach and interdisciplinary research training. Long-term support and maintenance 
of such strategic investments is essential to continue to develop cohorts of PhD graduates capable of working in and 
leading interdisciplinary research in order to meet industry R&D demand. Furthermore, such targeted doctoral centres 
need to be complemented by strategic core doctoral training funding to universities demonstrating research excellence in 
cyber security in order to maintain and grow the UK’s research capacity in the face of sustained core investment in such 
training internationally. 
In contrast to the UK – where a mixed portfolio of calls for research grants and centres operates – Germany has taken a 
primarily centre-based approach establishing large clusters of research excellence, for instance, ATHENE in Darmstadt, 
CISPA in Saarbrucken, Kastel in Karsruhe and Max Planck in Bochum, all a step change in the approach to research capacity 
building. These four centres on their own represent a strategic investment in Germany between 2015 and 2019 of over £100M. 
This contrasts with a total combined investment in the UK between 2012 and 2019 in larger initiatives – the four EPSRC-NCSC 
Research Institutes, CSIT and PETRAS – of £34M. Though the collective ACE-CSRs programme has attracted £1.2M of funding, 
the individual Centres of Excellence have received investments in the range of £20K–£80K which have been ringfenced for the 
organisation of events and engagement with government and industry, and do not include support for core research. 
Critically, the investments in centres in other countries, such as Germany, France and the USA are long term investments – the 
NSA Lablets programme in the USA has been running for 10 years and the investment in centres such as ATHENE, CISPA, Kastel 
and Max Planck is earmarked to grow further on a per annum basis beyond 2019. For example, ATHENE is expected to grow from 
£10M per year to £32M per year, while CISPA is expected to grow to £43M per year. 
Need to grow strategic investment 
The UK has built significant capacity over 2012-2019, especially through the ACE-CSRs, and complemented by other 
investments such as PETRAS and EPSRC-NCSC Research Institutes. There is a need to strengthen the strategic 
investment in the research excellence developed by the ACE-CSRs through support for research capacity building that 
will enable them to sustain and continue to compete with major international centres where strategic investments in cyber 
security research capacity are already being made.
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Compara t ive  leve ls  o f  inves tment
The data collected with respect to investment over the period 
2012–2019 allows a comparison of strategic investment in cyber 
security research across the key countries we have considered. 
In the UK £77M of investment has been made across a broad 
range of academic institutions through competitive research 
calls in strategic areas. With the exception of CSIT (11% of the 
total), the centres and research institutes receiving focussed 
investment are consortia of institutions, thus the strategic 
investment has been spread widely, across nearly 40 UK 
universities.
The investments in France and Germany were larger than 
the UK’s, at £97M and £111M respectively. When considered 
as a proportion of GDP, France’s investment was 34% and 
Germany’s 7% greater than that of the UK. The investments in 
France and Germany over the period have been more targeted 
than in the UK - much of the investment in France was through 
INRIA, the Institute for Research in Computer Science and 
Automation, and in Germany the majority was through large 
Centres and Institutes.  
Israel and Singapore made smaller strategic investments in 
absolute terms than the UK, at £24M and £64M respectively, 
but as a proportion of GDP these were substantially greater, 
with Israel at 2.3 times and Singapore at 6.5 times that of 
the UK’s. Israel’s investment was concentrated into the 
establishment of six centres, importantly leveraging an 
equivalent amount from industry. Singapore’s investments 
were split – with almost half being significant investments 
into specific institutions and the other half allocated through 
competitive cyber security calls.
Finally, the investment in the USA as a proportion of GDP was 
62% that of the UK’s, but in absolute terms the value of £356M 
was nearly five times that of the UK. The major sources for this 
funding were DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency), NSA (National Security Agency), DHS (Department 
for Homeland Security), and the NSF (National Science 
Foundation). Funding from DARPA, DHS and NSA totalled 
£69M in large, targeted, strategic investments. NSF managed 
significant volumes of investment through competitive 
calls: Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (£225M); and 
Cybersecurity Innovation for Cyberspace (£62M), both of 
which provided funding for projects across a wide range of 
institutions.
Since 2019, the step-change in investment by Germany stands 
out, with a projected commitment, post-2019, of hundreds of 
millions of pounds. This level of future investment has not been 
seen in the other countries in our comparator group, however, 
the available evidence indicates that commitments in those 
countries have continued on a level broadly similar to the 
period 2012–2019.
Need for a step change 
The US (NSF only) and UK funding landscapes share 
some similarities in that the available funds have been 
dispersed over a large number of relatively small 
projects. While this has been beneficial in terms of 
capacity building, the larger, longer-term awards in 
other countries, such as Germany, offer a major boost 
to cyber security capacity in those nations for the 
medium and long term. This is also the case for the US, 
where, as noted above, investments made in centres 
are widely spread, but they are also much larger than 
those in the UK.
Maintaining UK research’s international 
competitiveness 
In absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP, UK 
investment in cyber security research falls way 
behind our major competitors. In order to maintain 
the UK’s leading position in cyber security, the level of 
investment should be enhanced, particularly in view of 
the fact that other nations are further increasing their 
strategic funding.
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Longev it y  and  s ca le  o f  inves tment
The primary sources of funding for cyber security research 
in the UK have been the research councils (notably EPSRC, 
part of UKRI since 2018) and GCHQ (since 2016, primarily 
through the National Cyber Security Centre, NCSC). UK 
computer science academics have traditionally bid for projects 
of 36-month duration. The two phases of the National Cyber 
Security Programme have helped combat this tendency - while 
the first phase of each of the first three research institutes 
encouraged 36-month research projects, the second stage 
has established each institute for a further five-year period. 
The majority of the UKRI funds for this second phase have 
been to support the Director (e.g., salary) and the infrastructure 
to sustain the relevant communities – this contribution has 
been capped at approximately £1M full economic cost. There 
has been an additional £500K per year from the NCSC for 
each of the institutes in support of research projects. In 
contrast, the PETRAS Research Centre is funded as a national 
research centre for cyber security of Internet of Things. The 
first 36-month phase received £9.8M of public funding, with a 
further £13.8M in the second phase from 2019-2023 – the most 
significant public investment in the UK cyber security sector. 
PETRAS, however, considers broader issues including privacy, 
trust and ethics. With the exception of CSIT, the other large 
investments in cyber security have been fragmented across 
multiple projects.
In France, the majority of research funding is through INRIA 
(estimated at £80.9M between 2012 and 2019). The INRIA 
model of funding is mainly through project teams which are 
established for up to 12 years with a review every four years. 
In the US, DARPA and Government agency (NSA Lablets and 
DHS) projects tend to run for four–five years with multi-million 
pounds of funding. NSF funding profiles are more comparable 
to UKRI (EPSRC), for example, the Secure and Trustworthy 
Cyberspace programme funds activity across many 
universities with projects of three–four years in duration and 
funding levels ranging from £25K to £7M. The EU Framework 
Programmes have also been a major source of funding for 
European cyber security research. There are four current 
strategic projects in this area involving collaborations between 
industry and academia, piloting a European Cybersecurity 
Competence Network. All started in 2019, with the spend in the 
first year amounting to approximately £13M and a further £41M 
committed to these projects up until 2023. These projects 
involve collaborations between industry and academia, where 
the academic component is a varied proportion of the overall 
budget (ranging from 42% to 72%).
Elsewhere in Europe and in the US, there is a much more 
diverse landscape of funders, some of which are providing 
substantial and longer-term support for cyber security 
research. In Germany, funders include DFG, the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the Helmholtz 
Association and the Max Planck Foundation. Our data shows 
an investment of over £100M between 2012 and 2019 which 
includes the establishment of three competence centres in IT 
Security, a Max Planck Institute for Cyber Security and Privacy 
and a National Research Centre for Applied Cyber Security. 
There will be further investments of hundreds of millions in just 
these centres alone for the next six years. 
Importance of long-term investment at-scale  
The creation of the ACE-CSRs, the research institutes 
and other strategic initiatives over the last eight years 
have had a major impact in establishing and growing 
cyber security research capacity in the UK. This is 
far from a self-sustaining eco-system and strategic 
investment is critical beyond the end of the current 
National Cyber Security Programme. Such investment 
will need to take a long-term view of maintaining and 
growing the UK’s research capacity. Critically, it would 
need to do so in the presence of large-scale long-term 
investments in major competence centres in other parts 
of the world. 
Longer-term substantial investment fosters the creation of 
national facilities (such as the iTrust testbeds in Singapore) 
that offer an opportunity to significantly raise the level and 
quality of research in this area and become a global leader. 
Whilst the UK has a number of such facilities (for example, 
the industrial control systems and IoT testbed at University of 
Bristol; the Cyber Range at Cardiff University and Autonomous 
Vehicles testbed at University of Warwick), they have largely 
been funded through small grants and institutional support. 
Though such facilities are accessible to researchers nationally, 
the lack of core long-term funding limits their growth and role 
as national facilities. 
Need for national facilities for cyber security 
research  
The UK cyber security research community has now 
grown to a size where serious consideration should be 
given to what strategic investment is needed to support 
the creation of national facilities. This will establish the 
UK as the global leader in such large-scale facilities 
and, critically, in innovative products and services 
emerging from the research conducted in these globally 
unique research infrastructures. 
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Append ix :  Da ta  S ources
The following data sources were used for verification and validation of information from centre or project websites  
or press releases.
Country Data Sources
EU H2020 EU’s official CORDIS website
France There was no information available from centralised government sources. For all funding we used 
the project websites and the INRIA figures are estimated from annual reports.
Germany Federal ministry website for official figures including BMBF or the DFG. This information was not 
available for ATHENE, Helmholtz (CISPA III) and Max Planck. The figures for those centres come 
from media sites or the centres’ websites.
Israel There was no information available from centralised government sources. The figures are primarily 
derived from a news article, apart from The Center for Cyber Law and Policy at the University of 
Haifa, where we used a report from the University’s President. 
Singapore National Research Foundation’s website
UK EPSRC Grants on the Web and UKRI Gateway to Research. The exceptions are: 1) the SICSA 
funding that is reliant on a figure in a document from the Scottish Funding Council; 2) for the two 
recent ACE-CSRs at De Montfort University and Northumbria University no figures were available. 
Based on previous ACE-CSR funding, we assumed them to have a proportional allocation, which is 
included in the UK figures. 
USA The vast majority were cross-referenced and derived from the National Science Foundation’s 
website, with extra validation from the USA Spending website. Those from DARPA were derived 
from USA Spending (but are likely missing some data and hence should be assumed to be a 
lower bound rather than an upper bound). The Lablets were identified primarily through university 
websites (similar to DARPA, these should be assumed to be a lower bound rather than an upper 
bound).
Table 2: Summary of data sources used for verif icat ion and validat ion.
Fund ing  fo r  th is  re search
The research presented in this report was funded by the 
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). 
Conf lic t  o f  in te res t  s ta tement
The work is strictly the authors’ own and no influence has 
been exerted or input provided by the NCSC on the analysis, 
recommendations or any parts of the text. The authors are 
active researchers in the field of cyber security and receive 
funding from various sources, including the NCSC and EPSRC. 
In order to avoid bias, only data and sources for which we 
could find traceable evidence are included in the analysis and 
recommendations limited to the trends and themes observed 
in the data.
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